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MARCH-APRIL 1960
A REVIEW OF THE 1959 CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW DECISIONS
By HAROLD HURST
Professor Hurst is Acting Dean of the University of Denver College
of Law.
The Colorado Supreme Court ground out nearly seventy de-
cisions during 1959 in which constitutional or administrative law
issues were raised. Both space and time make it impossible to re-
view all of the decisions. Omitted from this review are those cases
considered unimportant, those which most likely will be reviewed
elsewhere, and those which turn on minute points or raise issues
without merit.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Due Process of Law-Definiteness and Certainty
The Colorado Supreme Court had occasion, in two cases, to
consider whether Colorado statutes were void for want of sufficient
definiteness and certainty in the definitions and terms used to meet
the requirements of due process of law. The judicial test established
by the Supreme Court of the United States, in applying the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, requires that the
language of a state statute defining liability be plain enough that
men of ordinary intelligence need not guess at its meaning.1
The state statute prohibiting sale or use of fireworks2 was in
question in People v. Young.3 The sole question, thought the court,
was whether the law was so vague and indefinite as to render it
unconstitutional under Art. II, Sec. 25 of the Colorado Constitution
and the fourteenth amendment. After defining the term "fire-
works," the legislature attempted to exclude certain kinds of fire-
works in the following language:
The term 'fireworks' shall not include toy pistols, toy guns,
sparklers or torches which do not contain explosive charges
or other devices in which paper caps manufactured in ac-
cordance with United States interstate commerce commis-
sion regulations for packing and shipping of toy paper caps
are used and toy pistol paper caps manufactured as pro-
vided in this article.
4
The court sustained the statute as being sufficiently definite and
unambiguous that "no ordinary person could be misled."
The Colorado statute5 defining insanity as a defense in criminal
prosecutions was attacked as being so uncertain, ambiguous and
unintelligible as to constitute a deprivation of due process and equal
protection in Castro v. People.6 The defendant relied on Durham
v. United States7 which is said to hold that neither the right and
wrong test nor the irresistible impulse test supply adequate criteria
1 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. If 53-5-1, 53-5-2 (1953).
3 339 P.2d 672 (Colo. 1959).
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 53-5-1 (1953).
5 Cola. Rev. Stat. 1 39-8-1(2)(1953).
.6 346 P.2d 1020 (Colo. 1959).
7 214 F.2d 862 (D.C.Cir. 1954).
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for determining criminal responsibility. It appears, on a careful
reading of the Castro case, that the court did not actually decide the
question raised, but held the matter to be one of policy and properly
left for legislative consideration.
Due Process-Adequacy of Notice
In two cases the Colorado Supreme Court stood between per-
sons and agencies of government to prevent impairments of prop-
erty rights without adequate notice of the proceeding. But in
another case it would appear that the court permitted-even order-
ed-impairment of private rights of persons not before the court.
The sufficiency of notice given by county commissioners of
deliberations leading to a rezoning ordinance was questioned in
Holly Development Co. v. Board of County Comm'rs.8 The no-
tice as published contained no reference to rezoning, erroneously
described the zone classification of the property to be rezoned, said
that the hearing would be at the "Court House" at a given day and
hour. Despite the fact that Holly Development knew about this
hearing, apparently understood its purpose, and actually appeared
and participated in the hearing, the court said that the notice was
insufficient, ambiguous and misleading, and unintelligible to the
average citizen who might be affected thereby. The failure to give
proper notice was thought to be dereliction in complying with man-
datory conditions precedent to the exercise of power.
In a probate proceeding one of the heirs obtained letters, an
order to publish notice, and, seemingly on the same day, a decree
of final settlement which cut off another heir who claimed a one-
half interest in the property of the estate. The aggrieved heir, learn-
ing of the situation some five and one-half years later, brought
action to set aside the final decree. The Colorado Supreme Court"
ruled that county courts sitting in probate matters have no more
authority to conduct proceedings without notice in disregard of due
process than do other courts or tribunals.
The court seems to have been caught napping in Lucas v. Dis-
trict Court.10 In Lucas, action had been brought to recover dam-
ages resulting from the alleged negligence of the defendant in an
auto accident. In pretrial discovery proceedings, plaintiff was tak-
ing the deposition of the defendant and asked whether defendant
had casualty insurance and, if so, the policy limits. Defendant ad-
mitted having such insurance but refused to answer as to policy
limits, obviously believing that the amount of insurance carried
had little to do with either liability or damages. A hearing was had
in the district court on the merits of the question whether defend-
ant should answer concerning policy limits and the question was
decided negatively in that court. The plaintiff sought mandamus
in an original proceeding in the Colorado Supreme Court for an
order directing the district court to order the defendant to answer
as to policy limits. The defendant was never notified or required
to appear to argue the question. One suspects that one of the in-
surance company counsel who appeared as amicus curiae represent-
ed the insuror of defendant, but the record is inconclusive. In any
8 342 P.2d 1032 (Colo. 1959).
9 Michels v. Clemens, 342 P.2d 693 (Colo. 1959).
10 345 P.2d 1064 (Colo. 1959).
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event, the Colorado Supreme Court, never noticing except in dis-
sent that the defendant was not represented in either brief or ar-
gument, decided that the defendant must disclose the limits of the
casualty insurance carried. Without further documentation of its
reasons for so deciding the numerous constitutional issues raised
by the briefs and oral arguments, the court simply said (on re-
hearing):
We have carefully examined the arguments and au-
thorities set forth in the briefs and have considered the oral
arguments of counsel which were offered at the hearing
which was extended to all of counsel, including amicus
curiae, and we are of the opinion that all of these conten-
tions are without merit. It seems doubtful to us in the
extreme that the Supreme Court of the United States would
conclude that this Court's construction of its own rule[
11]
constituted a violation of the provisions of the Constitution
of the United States.... 12
The court assumes that its construction of its own rule can not pos-
sibly be unconstitutional in its application!
In this case many constitutional issues were raised by counsel.
Some of them seemed to have merit. But Mr. Justice Hall noticed
the most fatal defect in the whole proceeding when he pointed out
that:
Now this court redetermines this identical question
'on its merits' and without having before it two of the par-
ties to the district court proceedings. Such determination
in my humble opinion is in violation of both federal and
state constitutional guaranties of due process and is there-
fore void for want of jurisdiction.
13
Mr. Justice Hall's point is well taken. The persons whose re-
sources were at stake in the case were the Moores. Their counsel
may well have had some good legal reasons why the plaintiff should
not have been permitted to inquire into the limits of their liability
policy equally cogent as those which would deny the plaintiff from
inquiring into how much property the Moores owned.
Arbitrary Interference With Property Rights
The Denver zoning ordinances of 1956 were struck down in
important parts as being in violation of due process of law, as being
abuses of police power, as being unreasonably discriminatory, or
as being retrospective in operation as applied to one of the parties. 4
The requirement that the owner of property in the B-6 district
provide large areas of off-street parking15 from which requirement
property in the adjoining B-5 district was exempt was declared to
be "unconstitutional when tested by the due process clause of the
11 Colo. R. Civ. P. 26(b) which provides, in pertinent part: " . . . the deponent may be examined
regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action."
12 345 P.2d 1064, 1074 (Colo. 1959).13 Id. at 1080.14 Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 347 P.2d 919 (Colo. 1959).
15 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Ordinance, art. 614 (amend. 1959).
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state and federal constitutions and by Article II, Section 15, of the
State Constitution which provides, inter alia, that 'private property
shall not be taken or damaged, for public or private use, without
just compensation.' 16 The court found that both B-5 and B-6 dis-
tricts were general business areas and that there was not sufficient
difference between them to warrant imposition of the burden of
off-street parking on one and exempt the other. Further, the court
could not find that requiring off-street parking had any relevancy
to the public health, safety and welfare. The latter reason for strik-
ing down the ordinance would probably prevent the imposition of
off-street parking requirements anywhere in the city.
Also declared to be invalid was the ordinance provision pro-
hibiting the extension of certain kinds of building uses declared
by the ordinance to be nonconforming.
17
The court further deemed the discrimination,18 between B-5
and B-6, as to the kinds of businesses permitted in each, size and
use of buildings, number of employees permitted, and other dis-
criminations, to be "unlawfully and unreasonably discriminatory."
Having already determined that the two areas were very similar in
nature, the court could see no reasonable basis for permitting the
operation of pawn shops and music studios in one and prohibiting
such uses in the other.
In Denver v. Greenspoon,19 the city created a sewer district
financed by special improvement assessments. The plaintiff owned
property which was incapable of being served by the sewer inas-
much as the sewer line was high on a bluff at the rear of plaintiff's
property. He brought action to have the assessment against his
property set aside. The court granted the relief requested, saying
that "To enforce a special assessment for a purpose which does not
confer a special benefit upon the property on which it is levied
would result in taking property without compensation, in violation
of due process of law.
-2 0
Delegation of Legislative Power
The extent to which the legislature may lawfully delegate its
authority was considered in four cases.
The Board of Regents of the University of Colorado is author-
ized to fix the charges for hospital services at Colorado General
Hospital "at a rate based upon the actual per diem expenses."
21
Upholding the formula, the court said, "That such is not a delega-
tion of legislative power, but rather the delegation of a power to
the Board to determine some fact, or state of things, upon which
the law as prescribed depends, appears beyond doubt.
'22
A Tri-County District Health Department was authorized by
law2 3 to make rules and regulations, violations of which were pun-
ishable as misdemeanors.24 A prosecution resulting in a conviction
for violation of one of the rules was reversed,25 the court ruling with
16 Denver v. Denver Buick, Inc., 347 P.2d 919, 923 (Colo. 1959).
17 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Ordinances, art. 617 (amend. 1959).
18 Denver, Colo., Rev. Municipal Ordinances, art. 612 if .9-1 and .10 (amend. 1959).
19 344 P.2d 679 (Colo. 1959).
20 Id. at 681.21 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 124-4-6 (1953).
22 Bettcher v. Colorado, 344 P.2d 969 (Colo. 1959).
23 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 66-2-7(4)(1953).
24 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 66-2-14 (1953).
25 Casey v. People, 336 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1959).
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very little discussion that the legislature had unlawfully delegated
its power contrary to the Colorado Constitution, Art. III.
In another case,2 6 the defendant was convicted of violating a
land use ordinance adopted by the voters in a soil conservation
district. The state statute27 attempted to authorize the adoption of
such ordinances by three-fourths of the voters voting in the district.
Violations of the ordinances were misdemeanors. Because the
statute left the determination of what acts would be punishable to
the voters, the court declared the statute to be an unlawful dele-
gation of power.
In an attempt to restore somewhat the pre-Merris status quo,
the legislature enacted a statute28 which would have given munici-
palities power to make and enforce ordinances imposing criminal
penalties for conduct of both local and statewide import, even
though the subject matter was covered by state law. Prosecution
under a municipal ordinance would have barred a prosecution for
the same offense under the state law, and vice versa. The Governor
requested an advisory opinion from the Colorado Supreme Court
which held 29 the law to be an unlawful delegation of legislative
power to cities, and that the law would authorize the adoption of
special and local laws in violation of the Colorado. Constitution,
Art. V, Sec. 25.
Municipal Ordinances v. State Statutes
In the wake of the Merris decision 30 have followed numerous
cases in which the courts have had to wrestle with the distinction
between matters of local concern and matters of state-wide concern
in order to decide upon the enforceability of municipal ordinances.
Merris held that drunken driving of a motor vehicle was of general
state-wide concern and that a state statute punishing drunken driv-
ing precluded municipalities from prosecuting under local ordi-
nances. The problem which is creating the greatest difficulty seems
to be whether home-rule cities may by ordinance punish for conduct
which is of general state-wide concern, but which is also somewhere
between a little bit and a great deal of local concern.
It was noted above that the Colorado Supreme Court unani-
mously struck down Senate Bill 72, passed by the Forty-ninth Gen-
eral Assembly, which would have authorized cities to enact and
enforce ordinances concerning matters which were at the same time
of both local and state-wide interest. The reason given was that
Art. V, Sec. 25 of the Colorado Constitution prohibits the legislature
from enacting local or special laws when a general law will do.
And otherwise, the legislature is prohibited from delegating its
power to enact general laws. Three recent decisions handed down
last year serve to illustrate the confusion brought about by Merris,
and also seem to indicate that what the legislature was told it could
not do in Senate Bill 72 without a constitutional amendment is,
nevertheless, being permitted with the sanction of judicial legisla-
tion.
26 Olinger Y. People, 344 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1959).
27 Colo. Rev. Stat. If 128-1-9, 128-1-14 (1953).
28 Senate Bill 72, Forty-ninth General Assembly.
29 In re Senate Bill 72, 339 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1959).
30 Canon City v. Merris, 137 Colo. 169, 323 P.2d 614 (1958).
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The three cases all arose in Denver and consequently involve
the special authority given home-rule cities by Article XX of the
Colorado Constitution to legislate upon any subject of local concern
with the same power as might otherwise be exercised by the
legislature.
Davis v. Denver31 held that Denver could not enforce an
ordinance prohibiting the operation of a motor vehicle by one whose
driver's license is suspended or revoked. In its opinion, the Colorado
Supreme Court said:
32
... Article XX of the Constitution does not grant to the
City authority to regulate matters of general and state-wide
concern and, as indicated above, this power can be exercised
by municipalities only if the State consents to its exercise
and provided that the matter, although predominantly
general, is one in which the municipality has sufficient
interest to warrant the delegation of power to it ....
A specially concurring opinion agrees with the result reached
by the majority in this case but sees trouble ahead by virtue of the
majority's finding power in the legislature to consent to local
legislation on matters predominantly of state-wide concern.
Denver was also denied power to prohibit driving a motor
vehicle while the driver's license was revoked, in Denver v. Palm-
er.33 In its opinion, the court said that the offense of driving while
the operator's license is suspended or revoked is a matter of general
state-wide importance and concern and, therefore, any attempt by
the city to legislate on this subject is ultra vires and void. Note the
absence in this case of the use of the term "predominantly of state-
wide concern."
In a third case,3 4 Denver claimed authority to regulate speed on
the Valley Highway, a limited access four- and six-lane non-stop
arterial highway traversing the city, connecting at both ends with
state highways, and carrying both local and through traffic. The
court sustained Denver's power to regulate speed, although as-
serting that the predominant interest was that of the state. The
opinion then asserts that the "right of the City to regulate speed
had been in fact recognized by the State by allowing the City to post
the highway and enforce its ordinances. The City, acting with the
consent and approval of the State, had the requisite jurisdiction in
the premises .... -35 There is here an apparent and substantial con-
flict with In Re Senate Bill 7236 concerning the validity of state per-
mission to cities to regulate matters predominantly of state-wide
concern.
Other Cases
The so-called severance tax enacted in 195337 imposing a gradu-
ated tax upon gross income derived from the production or extrac-
tion of crude oil and natural gas was contested by The California
Company38 as being unconstitutional for a number of reasons. The
31 342 P.2d 674 (Colo. 1959).
32 Id. at 677.
33 342 P.2d 687 (Colo. 1959).
34 Denver v. Pike, 342 P.2d 688 (Colo. 1959).
35 Id. at 687 (Emphasis supplied).
36 In re Senate Bill 72, 339 P.2d 501 (Colo. 1959).
37 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 138-1-7 (1953).
38 Calif. Co. v. Colorado, 348 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1959).
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company contended that the tax was repugant to the due process
and equal protection requirements of the state and federal consti-
tutions; that the tax is not an income tax but rather a property tax
and as such violates the state constitutional provisions requiring
uniformity 39 and limiting the rate of the levy; 40 and that the tax
unduly burdened interstate commerce and was therefore repugnant
to the federal constitution. The Colorado Supreme Court held that
the tax was an excise tax, and not a property tax. Laboring the
point long, the court finally concluded that the progression in the
tax rate in relation to gross income was not arbitrary and therefore
did not transgress equal protection and due process. The court dis-
posed of the objection on interstate commerce grounds by holding
that the tax fell upon income from an intrastate operation, the ex-
traction of oil and gas, before the oil and gas ever entered interstate
commerce.
An important decision 41 in the field of labor-management rela-
tions considered the question whether the Colorado state courts
could enjoin a labor union from picketing where the object was to
coerce the employer to operate a closed shop, conduct which is
defined as an unfair labor practice by the Colorado Labor Peace
Act.42 The same conduct is defined as an unfair labor practice in
the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.43 Further, the federal act gives the
National Labor Relations Board exclusive power to enforce Taft-
Hartley and provides that the board may cede its power to an
agency of the state.4 It is elementary and needs no citation that
federal power over labor management relations is predicated on the
effect of such relations upon interstate commerce. Nowhere in the
opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court is there an explanation why
the controversy between the plaintiff and the defendant should be
considered as affecting interstate commerce. The court's decision
that the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB over the matter ousted
the jurisdiction of the state court seems to be consistent with many
cases cited in the opinion-assuming that interstate commerce was
involved. But the United States Supreme Court has sustained many
injunctions entered by state courts to restrain unfair labor practices
in controversies not affecting interstate commerce.45
II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
Again, as in prior years, the administrative law cases reflect the
propensity of certain of the administrative agencies to be arbitrary
and capricious in the decision of cases before them and to fail in
making a record and findings sufficient for judicial review.
Decisions Contrary to the Evidence
As a practical matter, there would be little point in holding
hearings and taking evidence if decisions are not based upon evi-
dence. As a matter of constitutional right, a person whose liberty or
property is to be affected by a hearing is entitled to a finding and
39 Colo. Const. art. X 1 3.
40 Colo. Const. art. X I 11, limiting the state property tax levy to 4 mills on each $1 of valuation.
41 Building Constr. Trades Council v. American Builders, Inc., 337 P.2d 953 (Colo. 1959).
42 Colo. Rev. Stat. 1 80-5-6 (1953).
43 29 U.S.C. §1 157-58 (1956).
44 29 U.S.C. 1 160 (1956).
45 See, e.g., Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 585 (1953); International Bhd. of Teamsters
v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950).
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decision in accordance with the evidence.4 6 During 1959, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court reversed the decisions of administrative agen-
cies in at least four cases because the court deemed agency action
to be arbitrary and capricious in that the decision in each case was
clearly contrary to the evidence.
47
Necessity for Record and Findings
In three cases the Supreme Court reversed and remanded agency
actions because the agency had not made any record of the pro-
ceedings or evidence, making it impossible for the court to deter-
mine whether the decision was in accord with the evidence.4 8
Typical language to be found in the court's opinions reversing
and remanding such cases is the following from Colorado Banking
Board v. Finnigan4 9 in which the agency action was sent back "with
directions to the trial court to remand the matter to the Board...
for hearing in the plaintiff's application and the taking and record-
ing of all testimony, exhibits, and other evidence in support of the
application ... for the making of specific findings of fact as the basis
of an order granting or denying the license applied for."50
Variance Between Charge and Findings
Just as the finding must be in accord with the evidence, so
must the finding be consistent with the charge. In State Civil Serv-
ice Commission v. Conklin,51 the defendant, Commander of the
Soldiers and Sailors Home, was charged, in a complaint to the Civil
Service Commission, with negligent and wilful failure to control
fiscal matters, use of heavy-handed methods, failure to keep a physi-
cal inventory, refusal to cooperate with the governing board, in-
subordination, lack of capacity to prepare and supervise a budget,
lack of administrative ability, incompetent supervision of a boiler
installation, and failure to make proper inspections and reports. The
Civil Service Commission held a hearing on the complaint and en-
tered its findings and order, reciting that it found a "complete
breakdown and loss of confidence between the Board of Commis-
sioners . . . and the present Commander . . .has irritated members
of the Board of Commissioners .. The court held, therefore,
that Conklin should be removed.
The Supreme Court, on review, said, "The Commission made no
specific findings with reference to any of the seven charges pre-
ferred against Conklin .... it was improper to find him guilty of
shortcomings of which he was not charged . . . ,,53 The removal or-
der of the Civil Service Commission was vacated.
46 See Western & A. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639 (1929).
47 Colorado Transp. Co. v. P.U.C., 347 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1959); McNertney v. State Bd. of Examiners
of Architects, 342 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1959); Board of County Comm'rs v. Skoff, 340 P.2d 866 (Colo. 1959);
Buddy & Lloyd's Store No. 1, Inc. v. City of Aurora, 337 P.2d 389 (Colo. 1959).
48 Neverdahl v. Linder, 347 P.2d 512 (Colo. 1959); Buddy & Lloyd's, supra note 47; Colorado
Banking Bd. v. Finnigan, 336 P.2d 98 (Colo. 1959).
49 336 P.2d 98 (Colo. 1959).
50 Id. at 100 (Emphasis supplied).
51 138 Colo. 528, 335 P.2d 537 (1959).
52 Id. at 531-32. 335 P.2d at 538-39.
53 Id. at 533, 335 P.2d at 539-40.
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